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On the Timeliness of Price Discovery 
 
 




Price discovery is the process whereby value-relevant, private information becomes 
impounded or reflected in a stock's publicly-observable market price. The timeliness of price 
discovery refers to how quickly that process takes effect. 
There is no reason to believe either that all private information is discovered equally quickly 
or that price discovery is equally speedy for all firms. The latter observation suggests it would be 
worthwhile knowing why the timeliness of price discovery differs across firms, even the more so in 
an environment where all listed companies by law must disclose most material price-sensitive 
information as soon as they become aware of it. The other observation, that not all private 
information is discovered equally quickly, implies we should focus on a material, periodic event 
when we compare timeliness across firms. A good candidate is the announcement of the company’s 
annual results, since for many years is has been known that annual earnings alone captures at least 
half the value-relevant information released by the average firm over the 12 months leading up to 
this date. 
We use various approaches to explore measures of timeliness and what they can tell us. We 
review a number of studies that have considered various aspects of timeliness in different countries 
and extend and contrast their findings. We also examine the relationship between the timeliness of 
price discovery and analogous measures based upon firms’ formal disclosures to the share market 
and upon analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. Finally, we report on an issue of major concern to 
regulators and market operators, namely the influence of corporate governance on the timeliness of 
price discovery. 
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1 Introduction 
Timeliness is an old and important concept in accounting, where it refers to making 
information available to decision makers while it can still be used. In studies of financial markets, it 
has been applied when addressing the question, “How quickly is value-relevant information 
reflected in price?” Another strand of research, in the accounting literature, asks the reverse 
question,4 “How quickly is information that is priced by financial markets recognized in the 
accounts?” 
We explore timeliness in the first sense. We trace its development as an idea, mention settings 
where it has been estimated, and draw some interesting comparisons across studies. We also 
investigate its properties and relationships with analogous concepts based on corporate disclosures 
and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Within an economy, timeliness is related to stock price volatility, 
to the firm’s size, and to the quality of its corporate governance.  
The next section outlines the key concepts of timeliness and price discovery. This is followed 
by a review of the related literature. Then there is discussion of our examination of the timeliness 
metric and the results obtained. The final section summarises our conclusions. 
 
2 Basics 
By price discovery we mean the process whereby value-relevant, private information becomes 
impounded or reflected in a stock's publicly-observable market price. The timeliness of price 
discovery refers to how quickly that process takes effect.  
There is no reason to believe all private information is discovered equally quickly, neither is 
there any reason to believe price discovery is equally speedy for all firms. The latter observation 
suggests reasons for observing differences across firms could be interesting, perhaps the more so in 
a setting where firms are required by law to disclose any material price-sensitive information as 
soon as it becomes known.5  
The former observation, that not all private information is discovered equally quickly, 
suggests that if we wish to compare differences across firms in the timeliness of price discovery, 
                                                 
1 The authors are indebted to Rahul Kubchandani for excellent research assistance and to Tom Smith for insightful 
comments. 
2 Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University. 
3 Schools of Accounting and Banking and Finance, UNSW and UWA Business School. 
4 See Basu (1997) et seq. 
5 For example, the Continuous Disclosure provisions of Australian company law apply equally to all listed companies. 
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we should focus on a material and periodic event. For most of our analysis in this paper, we choose 
the initial disclosure of a listed company’s annual results, an event which we have known since 
Ball and Brown (1968) captures at least half the value-relevant information released by the average 
firm over the 12 months leading up to this date. We also need to measure speed over some time 
period. Given our choice of a company’s annual results, we use an annual period (specifically, 365 
days) ending 14 days after the announcement, to allow price to settle.6 For simplicity, call this 
ending date the benchmark date and the stock price at the end of the benchmark date the benchmark 
price.  
To illustrate our measure of timeliness, suppose we have an extreme case with two stocks A 
and B. Stock A’s price begins at say $10 at the start of the first day of the tracking year. At the end 
of the first day, the price is exactly $20, where it remains until the end of the benchmark date 
because no further value-relevant information is discovered after the first day that year. Then we 
get the solid line as in Figure 1. Stock B’s price begins at say $10 at the start of the first day of the 
tracking year where it remains until the start of the benchmark date (because no value-relevant 
information is discovered until the last day that year); and at the end of the benchmark day price is 
exactly $20, because previously-unavailable value-relevant information is discovered on the last 
day that year. Then we get the dashed line as in Figure 1. Note that the two stocks, A and B, are 
equally volatile. However, Stock A’s price discovery is clearly more “timely” than Stock B’s as it 
moves to the benchmark price more quickly. 



















                                                 
6 Beaver (1968) was perhaps the first to point out that share prices are significantly more volatile for at least two weeks 
after a U.S. listed company releases its fourth quarter’s financial results. 
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It is possible to construct a range of metrics for the timeliness of price discovery and in later 
sections we investigate some of them. For the time being we propose timeliness be measured as the 
average absolute difference between the log of price at the end of day t (beginning on day 
364−=t ) and the log of price at the end of day 0, which we have defined as the release 
(announcement) day +14 days. Thus,  







    (1) 
The subscript on T simply indicates this definition is the second of several definitions of timeliness 
we consider. For the two stocks, 02 =T  for Stock A and 0.7 for Stock B. Defined this way, the 
lower the value of 2T  the less time is taken to discover price, or equivalently, the more timely the 
price discovery. Clearly Stock A is more timely than Stock B, as indicated by 2T , but as mentioned 
above they are extreme cases. 
We acknowledge that the reporting lag, which is the time lag from the close of the financial 
year to the reporting date, varies by firm and according to its circumstances. Comparisons across 
firms and over time can be complicated by the reporting lag, but we will ignore it in this paper.  
The next section reviews the relevant prior literature and the timeliness concept. 
 
3 Related Literature 
The idea that prices adjust to information over time is not new. Seven papers, comprising four 
groups, are reviewed in this section: Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll (1969); Ball and Brown 
(1968), Alford, Jones, Leftwich and Zmijewski (1993), and Butler, Kraft and Weiss (2005); Brown, 
Taylor and Walter (1999); and Beekes and Brown (2006), and Beekes, Brown and Chin (2006). 
Fama et al. stands alone, because they began this literature when they studied the progressive 
adjustment of stock prices to value-relevant information associated with a stock split; Ball and 
Brown, Alford et al. and Butler et al. are grouped because they focus on the timeliness of price 
discovery in connection with accounting earnings information; Brown et al. is different to the 
extent that it deals with price discovery regardless of the nature of the information that is priced; 
and the remaining two papers consider the timeliness of price discovery as a product of the firm’s 
corporate governance. 
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3.1 The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Information Associated with a Stock Split 
Fama et al. (1969) (FFJR), on the adjustment of stock prices to new information, is a useful 
starting point. Focusing on stock price behaviour around stock splits, FFJR (pp. 1-2) ask two main 
questions: “(1) Is there normally some ‘unusual’ behavior in the rates of return on a split security in 
the months surrounding the split? and (2) if splits are associated with ‘unusual’ behavior of security 
returns, to what extent can this be accounted for by relationships between splits and changes in 
other more fundamental variables?” Their sample consists of 940 stock splits that occurred on the 
New Year Stock Exchange between 1927 and 1959. FFJR find that over the 29 months leading up 
to the month of a stock split, the average of the cumulative abnormal returns of stock splits rises 
rapidly at an increasing rate, but there is no further movement beyond the stock split month. Hence 
the market’s expectations relating to the information associated with a stock split are on average 
fully reflected in the stock price by the end of the stock split month at the latest. In other words, 
stock prices rapidly adjust to this new information such that no abnormal trading profits can be 
derived from a stock split. If we use their estimates to calculate 2T  over the last 12 months leading 
up to their month 0, which is the month in which the split took effect, then 514.02 =T .7 
3.2 The Timeliness of Price Discovery of Accounting Income Information 
The real genesis of our paper, however, lies in Ball and Brown (1968). The initial objective of 
the Ball and Brown paper was “to assess the usefulness of existing accounting income numbers by 
examining their information content and timeliness” (p. 176.) For a sample of 261 firms studied 
over 1957-1965, Ball and Brown conclude that, although the annual earnings number is highly 
value-relevant, “the annual income report does not rate highly as a timely medium, since most of its 
content (about 85 to 90 per cent) is captured by more prompt media…” (p. 176). In particular, with 
reference to the Abnormal Performance Indices (APIs) plotted over time in Figure 1 (p. 169) in 
their paper, they note (p. 171) that “The persistence of the drifts … suggests not only that the 
market begins to anticipate forecast errors early in the 12 months preceding the report, but also that 
it continues to do so with increasing success throughout the year”.  
Figure 2 graphs the Ball and Brown estimates for good and bad earnings news portfolios over 
the 12 months leading up to the report month (see their Table 5, columns headed Earnings Per 
Share [EPS]). To make the two time series comparable, the estimates have been re-scaled to range 
between 0 and 1. Note that the line for bad news mostly lies above that for good news, indicating 
price discovery was faster for bad news. This property is reflected in the timeliness metrics, which 
are 0.470 for good and 0.438 for bad news respectively. 
                                                 
7 We use the cumulative abnormal return averaged over all splits (Column 9 in their Table 2). 
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Nichols and Wahlen (2004) replicate the Ball and Brown (1968) estimates using more current 
data. Their sample comprises 31,923 reports by firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
stock exchanges and made between 1988 and 2001. They find similar results to Ball and Brown in 
that annual stock returns are strongly related to the sign of annual income changes. The relationship 
appears to be even stronger than in the Ball and Brown study period, as they find that the sign of 
the earnings change is associated with an average 35.6% difference in the abnormal returns of the 
good and bad earnings news portfolios, compared with Ball and Brown’s earlier estimate of 16.8%. 
Leaving that particular difference aside, we can apply the same re-scaling procedure to the results 
in Nichols and Wahlen’s Table 2 (p. 273). We can then see some other interesting differences in the 
two sets of estimates. The re-scaled results are graphed in Figure 3 (Nichols and Wahlen estimates 
for good and bad news), Figure 4 (Ball and Brown v. Nichols and Wahlen for good news) and 
Figure 5 (Ball and Brown v. Nichols and Wahlen for bad news). 
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 Figure 5 
 
We can draw a number of conclusions from these prior studies.8 First, there is a cross-over in 
the timeliness of good and bad earnings news in the USA in the later period studied by Nichols and 
Wahlen. Good earnings news has become timelier in the first half of the year, although bad news 
remains timelier in the second. Second, both good and bad news have become timelier in the later 
period, which could be for any number of reasons such as more frequent mandatory or voluntary 
corporate disclosures, increasing sophistication of financial analysts, speedier price discovery by 
market agents, and so on.  
Nichols and Wahlen were by no means the first to replicate the Ball and Brown study9 and 
with due respect to them they are unlikely to be the last. Among the many replications, the first to 
be published probably was Brown (1970), who found similar results for 118 Australian companies 
reporting between 1959 and 1968. There was, however, a noteworthy difference between Brown’s 
results and those of Ball and Brown: as regulators world-wide so often seem to believe,10 good 
news in Australia was “getting out” earlier than bad, as can be seen clearly in Figure 6. For 
completeness, the corresponding metrics are 0.525 for good news and 0.594 for bad. 
                                                 
8 We have not conducted any tests to see whether the conclusions are statistically reliable. 
9 The honour, if we can call it that, belongs to a University of Chicago MBA student who, in a term paper, replicated 
their result for non-December 31 firms. 
10 See, for example, comments below on the relationship between corporate governance and timeliness. 
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A more germane international replication is that of Alford et al. (1993), a large part of which 
is based on Ball and Brown (1968). They extend the Ball and Brown notion of timeliness to a 
comparison of the timeliness of accounting (GAAP) earnings reported between 1983 and 1990 in 
17 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. To measure timeliness, Alford et al. (1993) construct two hedge portfolios for 
each country. The first, which they term the “earnings-based” hedge portfolio, is an equally-
weighted portfolio long in firms with the highest 40% of income changes (“good news” firms) and 
short in firms with the lowest 40% of income changes (“bad news” firms) in that country sample. 
The second hedge portfolio, the “returns-based” hedge portfolio, is an equally-weighted portfolio 
long in firms with the highest 40% of 15-month market-adjusted returns (“good news” firms) and 
short in firms with the lowest 40% of market-adjusted returns (“bad news” firms) in that country 
sample. For both portfolios, a 15-month time horizon ending 3 months after a firm’s fiscal year end 
is used to calculate returns. Scaling the earnings-based portfolio cumulative return by the returns-
based hedge portfolio 15-month return “measures the proportion of all information impounded in 
stock prices that is captured by accounting earnings” (p. 200) and is used to control for cross-
country differences. 
 9 
Alford et al. (1993) construct three measures of timeliness from these two hedge portfolios. 
The first measure is the ratio at the end of each month of the firm-level mean cumulative market-
adjusted earnings-based hedge portfolio return to the corresponding return at the end of month 15. 
For any given month, this measure represents the proportion of the 15-month earnings-based 
portfolio return that has been earned by the end of that month, and thus will equal 1 for month 15. 
The second measure is the ratio at the end of each month of the firm-level mean cumulative 
market-adjusted earnings-based hedge portfolio return to the cumulative market-adjusted return-
based hedge portfolio at the end of month 15 (i.e., the “perfect foresight” cumulative return). The 
advantage of this metric over the first is that it adjusts for the information content of the accounting 
income number, and thus measures value-relevance as well. The third measure is a simple 
extension of the second. It sums the second measure over the 15 month time horizon. The larger the 
sum, the timelier and more value-relevant is the information. They find that Australia, Canada, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the U.K. are at least as timely as the U.S. benchmark, with 
each country outperforming the U.S. on at least one of the above measures. The timeliness of 
GAAP in Germany, Norway, South Africa, and Switzerland is similar to U.S. GAAP while GAAP 
in Belgium, Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Sweden all generate less timely 
information than U.S. GAAP, according to most of the metrics.  
Butler, Kraft and Weiss (2005) look at whether regulation has influenced earnings timeliness, 
where timeliness relates to the concept in Ball and Brown (1968) and as applied by Alford et al. 
(1993). Butler et al. study the effect of varying financial reporting frequency – particularly for the 
case of voluntary increases – upon the speed with which accounting information is reflected in 
price. They treat the concept of “timeliness” in two ways: intraperiod timeliness, which is based on 
Ball and Brown (1968) and Alford et al. (1993), and long-horizon timeliness, which is related to the 
reverse regression question addressed by Basu (1997) and subsequent literature. Butler et al. (2005) 
describe these two terms as follows: “Intraperiod timeliness measures the speed of earnings-based 
price formation during a specific period (e.g., a year) … Long-horizon timeliness, in contrast, 
represents the extent to which accounting income lags economic income … Long-horizon 
timeliness is closely linked to the concept referred to in the literature as valuation (or value) 
relevance.” (pp. 7-8.) The first measure is more relevant to this paper. We leave the relationship 
between the Ball and Brown and Basu notions of timeliness to a separate paper. 
In order to measure intraperiod timeliness, Butler, Kraft and Weiss use two metrics. The first 
is similar to the Alford et al. (1993) metrics. It requires construction of a hedge portfolio 
comprising long positions in firms in the top 27% of scaled earnings changes and short positions in 
the bottom 27%. The timeliness metric is thus based upon the speed at which hedge portfolio 
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returns are earned over the 12-month fiscal-year, i.e., the ratio of the earnings-based portfolio return 
at the end of each month to the hedge portfolio 12-month return. The metric is calculated as the 
area under the graph of the above ratio plotted over the 12-month period. The second metric is 
referred to as “an individual intraperiod timeliness statistic for each firm (IPT)” (p. 13) and roughly 
mirrors both the construct of Beekes and Brown (2006) and our own 2T  metric defined previously. 
Their metric is calculated as: 










      (2) 
where mBH  represents the stock’s buy-and-hold return from month 1 through to month m. 
For a sample of 28,824 reporting-frequency observations from 3,702 NYSE and AMEX-listed 
firms over the period 1950-1973, Butler, Kraft and Weiss find little difference in the intraperiod 
timeliness for firms reporting on a quarterly basis compared to those reporting on a semi-annual 
basis. Although they note that, for the first timeliness metric, firms reporting quarterly exhibit a 
larger timeliness figure (6.21) compared to firms reporting semi-annually (5.82), the difference is 
not statistically significant. Further, these results hold even after controlling for the fact that firms 
self-select their reporting frequency. Butler, Kraft and Weiss also found firms that voluntarily 
increased their reporting frequency displayed significant improvements (at the 10% level for their 
IPT regressions) in intraperiod timeliness, which is consistent with findings reported later in this 
paper (we find timeliness is increasing in the number of documents weighted by their price impact). 
Meanwhile firms that increased their reporting frequency following changes to mandatory reporting 
requirements imposed by the SEC in 1970 exhibited only insignificant improvements in intraperiod 
timeliness. This finding contrasts with an earlier paper by Brown, Taylor and Walter, to which we 
now turn. 
3.3 The Timeliness of Price Discovery of Wider Information Sets 
A key difference between the papers discussed in Section 3.2 and Brown, Taylor and Walter 
(1999) is the classification of “good” and “bad” news. Alford et al. (1993), for example, make this 
classification based on an accounting signal (size of the change in income) and rank the results to 
construct a hedge portfolio for each country. Brown et al. (1999), however, use a cumulative return 
measure over a one-year horizon and preserve the overall nature of the news.  
Brown et al. find the passage of Australian legislation encouraging increased disclosure was 
followed by timelier price discovery for smaller firms, many of which were, arguably, the target of 
the legislation. From a methodological viewpoint, the significance of their paper was its extension 
of the information set from information about earnings (as in Ball and Brown and following papers) 
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to any information that is priced. The extension is important, especially in the Australian 
environment, because GAAP earnings are but one, albeit price sensitive, component of the annual 
release.11  
Their research question is the effect of “significant statutory civil and criminal sanctions on 
both the quantity and timeliness of voluntary disclosures made by firms listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange” (p. 138). The sample consists of 1,474 ASX-listed firms, over the period 1992-
1996. The choice of this time period makes use of the 1994 legislative changes that imposed new 
statutory civil and criminal sanctions to reinforce pre-existing ASX disclosure rules, which allows a 
comparison of the pre- and post-sanctions environments. Brown, Taylor and Walter employ a 
number of indicators of the richness of the firm’s information environment, including: the 
frequency of corporate disclosures; the extent of disagreement among, and accuracy of, analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecasts; the relationship between corporate disclosures and share price 
volatility; and the level of anticipation in share prices of the information content of periodic reports.  
Brown, Taylor and Walter use this last indicator to measure “timeliness”. A feature of their 
analysis is that interim reports are also considered. That is, the timeliness of both Preliminary 
Financial Statements (PFSs) and Half-Yearly Reports (HYRs) is examined, with returns calculated 
over a 12 month time horizon leading up a to PFS release date and a 6 month time horizon leading 
up to a HYR release date. Their timeliness metric is calculated as the ratio of the average 
cumulative market-adjusted return from time 12−=t  ( 6−=t  for half-yearly reports) up to time t , 
to the average cumulative market-adjusted return to time 0=t , for their portfolios. The faster this 
metric approaches “1” the more timely the information; i.e., the faster the price discovery. Their 
experimental design involves constructing hedge portfolios that are long in good news firms and 
short in bad news firms, where the nature of the news is based upon the sign of the market-adjusted 
return over the relevant time horizon. They do not specifically examine the timeliness of good news 
compared to bad news. Two separate portfolios are constructed: one consisting of firms that 
reported prior to the 1994 legislative changes, i.e., a “pre-sanctions” portfolio, and the other of 
firms that reported after the legislative changes, i.e., a “post-sanctions” portfolio.  
Referring to Table 5 of their paper, Brown, Taylor and Walter find that the legislative change 
relating to disclosure sanctions had little if any impact on the timeliness of the half-yearly report, 
since there was no significant difference between the amount of information reflected in post-
sanctions prices compared to the amount of information reflected in pre-sanctions prices for any 
                                                 
11 As Beekes and Brown (2006, p. 9) note, “Australian listed companies make extensive disclosures in their Preliminary 
Final Statements. For example, they include standard form Income Statements, Balance Sheets, Statements of Cash 
Flows, dividend announcements and details of any completed or planned capital raisings.” 
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given month leading up to the release date. In the case of PFSs, however, information was 
impounded into share prices significantly faster after month -9, as the amount of information 
reflected in post-sanctions prices was greater than the amount of information reflected in pre-
sanctions prices for any given month leading up to the release date (~10-20% of the total 
information) and the probability of this being a chance result was negligible (<0.008 after month 
-9).12 Hence the annual earnings information became timelier following the imposition of statutory 
criminal and civil sanctions for non-disclosure. Further investigation revealed the effect was mainly 
restricted to smaller firms. Their hedge portfolio results for PFSs are reproduced in Figure 7. 
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3.4 Timeliness and Corporate Governance  
Beekes and Brown (2006) and Beekes, Brown and Chin (2006) explore the relationship 
between corporate governance and various indicators of the firm’s information environment, 
including its disclosure practices, properties of analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts, and 
timeliness as measured by 2T  (defined above). The first paper employs Australian data, and the 
second replicates the first for a sample of Canadian companies. Both papers essentially ask the 
same question: “Do better governed firms make more informative disclosures?” Focusing on the 
“timeliness” indicator, Beekes and Brown (2006) construct a timeliness metric (“intrayear” in 
                                                 
12 Brown, Taylor and Walter (1999) employ a non-parametric re-sampling test. See their Table 6 for detailed results on 
PFSs. 
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Butler, Kraft and Weiss’s terminology) that is based upon Ball and Brown (1968) and Brown, 
Taylor and Walter (1999), and describe the metric as being designed to capture the average speed 
of price discovery throughout the year. In the first paper, their metric tracks a firm’s share price 
over 250 ASX trading days, ending 10 trading days after the release of the firm’s PFS. Formally, 
the Beekes and Brown (2006) metric is defined (p. 431) as: 









     (3) 
where tP  is the market-adjusted share price at time t , and time 0=t  corresponds to 10 trading 
days after the earnings announcement. This is almost identical to our own construct, 2T , the sole 
difference being whether we work in calendar or trading days.  
As noted in both papers, the cM  metric can be interpreted as follows. The longer it takes for a 
firm’s share price to impound information and tend to the “final” price 0P  (which reflects all value-
relevant information discovered during the year), the longer the absolute value term in cM  will 
remain large, thereby inflating cM . In particular, if the share price simply tracked the market 
index13 from day 249−  to day 1− , and fell from 249−P  to 0P  on the last day, then the speed of 
adjustment is at its slowest and cM  will be “close to”’ the absolute value of the market-adjusted 
return over the 250 trading days. But if the share price changed to 0P  on the first trading day (day 
249− ) and then simply tracked the market index for rest of the trading period, the speed of 
adjustment will be at its maximum and cM  is zero. Beekes and Brown remark that the presence of 
excessive share price volatility complicates the use of their metric. This relationship with volatility 
is explored further, below. 
The Beekes and Brown (2006) timeliness analysis sample consists of 1,226 PFS observations 
accumulated from the set of 250 Australian firms rated in the Horwath (2002) Corporate 
Governance Report. They find that value-relevant information is incorporated more rapidly into 
share prices when a firm has a better corporate governance structure, and they note that timeliness 
and the nature of the news are also statistically related, such that good news is reflected in share 
prices earlier than bad news.14 These results hold when the timeliness metric is scaled by a 
volatility-measure, to reduce the effects of noise in the sample. Beekes and Brown (2006) further 
incorporate a “good news-CGQ” interaction term into their analysis, to account for the ASX 
                                                 
13 Beekes and Brown (2006) use both observed and market-adjusted prices and find market-adjustment makes little 
difference to their results. 
14 A ‘good news’ firm is defined to be one that outperforms the market index over the 250 trading day period during 
which timeliness is measured. 
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Corporate Governance Council’s belief that better governed firms are more “balanced” in their 
disclosure of good and bad news. They find that this variable is statistically related to the timeliness 
metric, suggesting that “better governed firms are more balanced in the extent to which good and 
bad news are reflected in share prices on a timely basis” (p. 441). 
Beekes, Brown and Chin (2006) largely replicate the Beekes and Brown (2006) timeliness 
analysis using evidence from Canada between 2000 and 2005. Their sample consists of the set of 
Canadian firms rated in the in the 2004 Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board 
Effectiveness Corporate Governance Report. They find similar results to Beekes and Brown (2006), 
namely that CGQ is directly related to the speed with which value-relevant information is priced by 
the market. Interestingly, the relationship between the nature of the news and timeliness is not 
significant for the “raw” timeliness metric. However, for the volatility-deflated timeliness metric, 
similar results to Beekes and Brown’s are found with respect to both CGQ and the nature of the 
information released (good vs. bad). Extending their analysis to account for the possible interaction 
between CGQ and the level of “balance” in the nature of the news disclosed, they find, as did 
Beekes and Brown, that the “good news-CGQ” interaction term is statistically related to timeliness, 
suggesting “managers of better governed firms are not as quick to release good news to the market, 
despite the incentive to do so” (p. 18). 
Finally, Beekes and Brown (2006) also report on the relationship between corporate 
governance and the timeliness of price discovery for a sample of U.S. firms whose corporate 
governance was rated by Brown and Caylor (2004). Once again, timeliness is found to be associated 
with the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. The overall findings (for the USA, Australia and 
Canada) are summarised in Table 1. As can be seen from Table 1, firms with good news, larger 
firms and firms with better corporate governance are more timely. It is interesting to note that 
corporate governance appears to have a larger impact on timeliness in Australia than in Canada or 
the USA. 
3.5 Summary 
The above literature suggests the existence of some observable relationships between the 
timeliness of price discovery and characteristics of a financial market’s reporting and information 
trading environment. The nature of earnings information, the strength of reporting regulations, and 
the quality of corporate governance have all been investigated in prior literature in relation to 
timeliness. Prior studies have yielded sometimes contrasting results. They provide a strong 
motivation to examine the properties of the timeliness metric in greater detail, which is the focus of 
this paper.  
 15 
Table 1: Beekes and Brown’s estimates of the relationship between timeliness and the “quality” of 
corporate governance for three countries 
 USA AUSTRALIA CANADA 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. prob. Coeff. t-stat. prob. Coeff. t-stat. prob. 
Constant 0.291 107.35 <0.001 0.219 33.87 <0.001 0.203 32.89 <0.001
Good News -0.017 -6.01 <0.001 -0.029 -4.54 <0.001 0.035 0.56 0.578 
Size -0.054 -19.24 <0.001 -0.043 -7.09 <0.001 -0.067 -7.65 <0.001
Resource Ind.    0.003 0.60 0.550    
CGQ -0.016 -6.09 <0.001 -0.035 -4.90 <0.001 -0.022 -3.96 <0.001
R2 (Adj.) 0.062   0.095   0.168   
N 8,664   1,226   694   
Sources: Beekes and Brown (2006); Beekes, Brown and Chin (2006). 
 
 
4 Further Examination of the Timeliness Metric 
This section of the paper discusses the tests conducted on the timeliness metric evaluating its 
ability to capture information timeliness, the influence of share price volatility on the metric and the 
ability of the metric to detect changes in the timing of firms’ disclosures. The sample comprises 
firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 
2005 and with sufficient data for conducting the tests. In Section 4.1 we consider relationships 
between the timeliness metric calculated in three related settings: prices, earnings forecasts and 
corporate disclosures. In Section 4.2 we consider the metric’s time-series properties. In Section 4.3, 
we discuss the connection between timeliness and volatility, while Section 4.4 contains a Monte 
Carlo analysis of the metric’s ability to detect managerial intervention in timing the release of 
price-sensitive disclosures. 
4.1 Timeliness in Three Analogous Settings 
The timeliness metric, as we have defined it, looks at pricing outcomes and pays no attention 
to the means by which price discovery occurs. In this section, we investigate the association 
between the timeliness of prices, and analogous measures of the timeliness of corporate releases to 
the share market and of analysts' forecasts. In brief, we find that, despite the noisy character of the 
timeliness measures and the fact that not all value-relevant information is sourced from the 
company itself, the timeliness of stock prices, of analysts' consensus earnings forecasts and of 
corporate disclosures are positively correlated. 
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Prices. For the metric based on prices, we measure timeliness by 2T , as previously defined, 
except that prices are adjusted for market movements.15 The sample of firms is all companies listed 
on the ASX with (1) at least a year’s daily returns data, and (2) PFS announcement dates available 
from ASX’s Signal G, which is a “same day” commercial, electronic data feed containing an edited 
text version of all company announcements to ASX. The date range is from 1 January 1995 (which 
is the first full calendar year for which the relevant announcement dates are available 
electronically) to 31 December 2005, which is the end-date of the edition of SIRCA’s CRD that we 
use.16 The ASX All-Ordinaries Accumulation Index, sourced from Datastream, is used to calculate 
the market-adjusted price series.  
Analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. Data requirements for this timeliness measure, which 
is based upon analyst earnings forecasts, are consensus EPS forecasts, forecast dates, actual EPS 
and their announcement dates, and stock prices relative to the forecast dates. We source all of these 
data from the I/B/E/S summary database. To be included in the sample, the first forecast date must 
be between 365 and 425 days before the report date, and the last forecast date must be between 1 
and 60 days before the report date. This ensures that there are sufficient consensus forecasts 
available to calculate the timeliness metric. Median analysts’ forecasts, deflated by the last 
available stock price reported by I/B/E/S up until day -365 to express them as a rate of return, are 
used to measure the consensus forecast. These (deflated) forecasts are then forward filled from day 
-365 to day 0,17 and the timeliness metric calculated in a manner analogous to 2T . Hence,  









02 365      (4) 
where tDF  is the median forecast EPS on day t  divided by the base price. This measure of 
timeliness, EPST2 , examines how quickly to the consensus earnings forecast converges on the actual 
earnings, as reported by I/B/E/S. Therefore 0=t in this timeliness measure is the date on which the 
earnings are released as reported by I/B/E/S, in contrast with the 2T measure based on prices. As 
with 2T based on prices, smaller values of 
EPST2  indicate that there is greater timeliness (i.e. there is 
quicker convergence of the forecast to the actual earnings). 
                                                 
15 This is done to be consistent with Beekes and Brown (2006). However, they point out that market-adjustment makes 
little difference to their results. 
16 SIRCA is an established acronym for the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific; CRD is the acronym 
for SIRCA’s Core Research Database. 
17 Forward filling refers to carrying forward the previously-reported deflated consensus forecast up until the current 
forecast date. This procedure accommodates irregular time intervals between successive I/B/E/S cut-off dates and 
between the last available forecast date and the actual reporting date. 
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Corporate disclosures. Australian law requires listed companies to notify ASX first when 
making a public disclosure. ASX then releases the disclosure document to the market. For ASX 
listed firms between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2005 with at least one document earlier than 
350−=t and one document later than 13=t , which ensures sufficient disclosure history, we 
collect data on the document releases to the ASX. We use ASX’s Signal G to identify the days on 
which each listed company released a document. We then weight that document-day by the 
absolute value of the stock’s log return that day, which reflects the price sensitivity of the 
documents. The daily time series of returns (which are zero on days when there is not any 
information released to the market) are cumulated so that all days in the series have a cumulative 
value. The log return is again sourced from SIRCA’s CRD. The timeliness measure is calculated as 
follows: 









Docs ,CDCDT      (5) 
where CD  is the cumulative value of returns. In this timeliness measure, DocsT2 , 0=t  is the date on 
which the firm’s annual results are released according to ASX Signal G plus 14 days (as in 2T ). 
The timeliness metric for disclosures is analogous to the metric for price discovery: it measures 
how quickly the firm releases its price-sensitive documents to the share market over the course of 
the year. As previously, smaller values of DocsT2  are associated with greater timeliness. 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the three timeliness measures (of stock prices, 
analysts’ EPS forecasts and corporate disclosures), while Table 3 contains the simple (product-
moment) correlations between these three variables.  
 
Table 2: 
Descriptive statistics for the three timeliness metrics (prices, disclosures and analysts’ EPS 




Mean 0.26 0.05 0.48 
Median 0.18 0.01 0.48 
Maximum 3.03 2.00 1.00 
Minimum 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 0.26 0.17 0.15 




Product-moment correlations between the three timeliness metrics  




EPS forecasts 0.32  
Disclosures 0.14 0.03 
 
The minimum values of the timeliness of prices, EPS forecasts and disclosures are either zero 
(the lower bound) or “close to” it. The maximum values of the timeliness of prices and EPS 
forecasts exceed 1, while the maximum value of the timeliness of disclosures is exactly one, which 
is its upper bound. There is some skewness apparent in the timeliness of prices and especially EPS 
forecasts, suggesting a more thorough investigation should take this into account, particularly for 
EPS forecasts. In terms of how the metrics are statistically related to one another, while the simple 
correlation between the timeliness of corporate disclosures and of consensus EPS forecasts is weak, 
both variables are more strongly correlated with the timeliness of prices. Moreover, all three 
correlation coefficients are positive, which is the expected sign. Our timeliness metric, 2T  
examines the outcomes and pays little attention to the means of price discovery. Nevertheless, our 
results suggest that our concept of timeliness, 2T , calculated using market-adjusted prices does 
capture important information. Despite the fact that not all of the value relevant information is 
being released by the company, there are positive correlations between 2T  and the analyst earnings 
forecasts and also between 2T  and the returns on days of corporate releases. 
4.2 Serial Dependence in the Timeliness of Prices 
If the timeliness of prices is driven by factors such as corporate governance attributes as well 
as by underlying volatility, seasonalities and so forth, and if the underlying drivers evolve over 
time, then we should observe (1) positive serial dependence in the timeliness of price discovery and 
(2) declining autocorrelation functions for timeliness at the firm level.  
Table 4 contains year-by-year bivariate correlations for the timeliness metric 2T . The 
correlations reflect all cases where there are sufficient daily returns on SIRCA’s CRD and 


























T2 1996 0.267          
T2 1997 0.253 0.249         
T2 1998 0.214 0.213 0.340        
T2 1999 0.334 0.179 0.321 0.251       
T2 2000 0.252 0.188 0.334 0.329 0.353      
T2 2001 0.174 0.088 0.340 0.258 0.357 0.331     
T2 2002 0.168 0.137 0.237 0.205 0.117 0.178 0.254    
T2 2003 0.204 0.116 0.367 0.244 0.353 0.316 0.370 0.213   
T2 2004 0.333 0.125 0.342 0.243 0.387 0.313 0.279 0.264 0.284  
T2 2005 0.123 0.201 0.317 0.289 0.182 0.217 0.249 0.243 0.288 0.344 
 
Apart from the significant positive correlation (r > 0.1) between the timeliness metric 2T  for 
any two given years, there is evidence of some weakening in the correlations as we increase the 
time lag between the years. Thus the correlation between 2T  in adjacent years is higher than in non-
adjacent years by a ratio of 2:1. Similarly, the correlation is higher for 2T  two years apart than for 
2T  more than two years apart (by a ratio of 2.6:1), while the corresponding ratios for three and 
more than three, and for four and more than four years apart, are 1.3:1 and 2:1. However, the size 
of the effect is evidently not large. 
4.3 Timeliness and Volatility 
Volatility is not unrelated to the metric we use to measure the timeliness of price discovery. 
The core idea behind our measure, however, is that the sequence of prices matters. The formal 
relationship is explored in the appendix, for a closely-related timeliness measure. The conclusion 
can be summarised as follows. When timeliness is measured by the mean squared deviation of the 
daily price from the benchmark (terminal) price, there is a simple relationship between the 
volatility of price (specifically, not return) and the timeliness of price discovery: timeliness is the 
volatility of price plus the square of the bias in price relative to the benchmark price. That is why 
the sequence of prices matters in our measure of timeliness. 
We can also examine this relationship empirically. To do so, volatility is calculated as the 
standard deviation of daily log return, sampled over the same 365 day time period, and using the 
same share price and market index data as that used to calculate timeliness metric 2T . We can see 
evidence of this relationship between timeliness and share-price volatility in the year-by-year 
bivariate correlations for an 11-year time period (see Table 5). As expected, the timeliness metric is 
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strongly positively correlated (0.5 < r < 0.7) with volatility for each timeliness-volatility pair. 
Hence it is reasonable to expect excessive share price volatility to inflate the timeliness metric for 
an individual firm, as indicated by the derivation in the appendix and by Beekes and Brown (2006). 
 
Table 5: Year-by-year bivariate correlations for timeliness metric 2T  and volatility  
 Timeliness 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Volatility 0.682 0.545 0.600 0.571 0.606 0.639 0.679 0.606 0.636 0.715 0.672
 
4.4 How Accurately Does the Timeliness Metric Identify Managerial Intervention? 
The assumption in Beekes and Brown (2006), and Beekes, Brown and Chin (2006), is that 
management intervention affects the timeliness of price discovery. Therefore corporate governance 
could have a key role in determining the timeliness of information released to the market. We 
employ a simulation model to investigate how well the metric identifies an intervention that affects 
the sequence of otherwise random stock returns. 
We assume log return is independently and Normally distributed with mean 12% p.a. and 
daily standard deviation 2%.18 In the simulation, we assume management intervenes in the 
disclosure process twice, once in the first half of the year and once in the second (with the effect of 
shifting returns by the same amount). We preserve the volatility of return in our simulation as 
explained below. We vary just two parameters: the size of each of the two returns that are the 
subject of managerial intervention, and the number of days the value-relevant information is moved 
forward.  
It is assumed that management intervenes in the disclosure process twice per annum to make 
releases on a more timely basis: once in the first half and once in the second half of the year. The 
amount of the intervention ranges from -25% to +25% in increments of 0.5%. The amount of 
intervention is set by the delta. The annual delta is divided by 2, since the same amount of 
manipulation is assumed in both halves of the year (i.e., the combined effect of the intervention, 
delta, ranges from -50% to +50%). Note that the release day, day t , must occur after the maximum 
amount of lag (the number of days by which the information may be moved forward by the 
manager). This lag or time which information may be moved forward is assumed to range from 1 to 
61 days and is assumed to be the same for both halves of the year. When the delta and day t  have 
                                                 
18 We do not need to run Monte Carlo simulations to understand the behaviour of our timeliness metric in this initial 
setting. However, we intend to introduce greater complexity, e.g., via stochastic volatility, and a simulation approach 
will facilitate this aspect of our future work. (The bumps in the surfaces of Figures 9–11 reflect the finite number of 
trials in the Monte Carlo analysis.) 
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been set, we retain one set of returns at this point as the ‘unmanaged’ benchmark set of returns over 
the year. This enables calculation of 2T  for the unmanaged returns.  
For the managed set of returns, we choose the lag and determine the new release date for the 
information (calculated as day t  – lag). We then switch the return on the release date with the 
return on the new, earlier release date to preserve the volatility of returns. The same procedure is 
then carried out in the second half of the year, assuming the same lag and delta. The timeliness 
metric for the managed returns is then calculated and compared with the unmanaged case. If our 
metric is able to correctly identify management intervention in the disclosure process, we would 
expect the managed case 2T  to be smaller than for the unmanaged case.  
The results from 10,000 trials per size-lag combination are graphed in Figures 8–10. Figure 8 
gives the overall rate at which the timeliness metric, 2T , correctly identifies the intervention. 
Figures 9 and 10 graph the accuracy rate where the cumulative return for the year is negative (bad 












Clearly the metric is by no means perfect as there is not 100 per cent accuracy. Nonetheless 
accuracy improves with the size of the return that is subject to managerial intervention (delta). 
When there are two interventions aggregating to +50% (i.e., delta = +50%), the metric correctly 
identifies the interventions about 85% of the time. However, when they aggregate to -50%, the 
accuracy rate falls to about 68%. The reason for the fall in the accuracy rate becomes clear when 
we turn to Figure 9 (where the year’s return is non-negative, i.e., when 3640 −≥ PP ) or to its bad 
news counterpart, Figure 10. When the intervention shifts a return with sign opposite to the 
aggregate return for the whole year, the accuracy rate of the metric falls sharply. The number of 
cases with delta <0 in Figure 9 or delta >0 in Figure 10 declines rapidly as delta becomes larger, 
which explains why the overall accuracy rate of the metric (Figure 8) exceeds 50% for all but those 
cases where the absolute value of delta is of the order of 2%, which is the volatility parameter in the 
simulation model. 
An alternative metric is to calculate the time series of the absolute value of the daily log 
return, and to use this time series to calculate timeliness. The result from simulations calculated 
using the absolute value of daily log return is shown in Figure 11. While this metric performs 
extremely well in Monte Carlo analysis – its accuracy rate is about 100% for delta ≥ 5% in absolute 
value – the alternative metric makes no allowance for the fact that most price changes during a year 
are offsetting.19   
 
                                                 






The notion of timeliness we have explored is not new. It began with Ball and Brown (1968) 
but it has been used only sparingly, in a variety of settings, over the intervening 40 years. Although 
our timeliness metric, 2T , is clearly a noisy measure, it nonetheless does capture some systematic 
differences in the pattern of price discovery and it manifests several properties consistent with our 
intuition.   
In this paper, we have shown that the timeliness of price discovery is related to analyst 
earnings forecasts and corporate disclosures. In addition there appears to be serial dependence in 
timeliness which declines over time. However, the timeliness metric is also found to be affected by 
the volatility of the share price, which inflates our metric. In simulations, where we explicitly 
control for volatility, 2T  appears to perform well with up to 85 per cent of interventions in the 
disclosure process being correctly identified. However, our results also show that 2T  is unreliable 
in settings of greatest regulatory interest: where managers privy to impending bad news bring 
forward whatever credible good news they can find. An alternative metric, based on the absolute 
value of the daily log return, does not suffer from the same disability in that, in a controlled setting, 
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Appendix: Timeliness and Volatility 
 
We define three timeliness metrics, where the second is the one we work with while the first 























t PPT  
 
where tP  is the share price at the end of each trading day t  and day 0 is 14 days after the public 
announcement of the company's profit (net income) for the year. 
 
Relationship with Volatility 
The easiest way to see the relationship with volatility is to observe that a stock's log price 
volatility – specifically, not return volatility, although they are directly related – over that same 
time period is approximately (i.e., ignoring the degrees of freedom issue) given by: 










t PPs . 
 
3T  (which is similar to 2T ) can be expressed as: 
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Thus we have: 
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3 TsT += . 
